It has hitherto been
assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all
attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by
means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge,
have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the
experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we
assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears,
at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining
the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the
cognition of objects a priori, of determining something with respect
to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do
just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial
movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming
that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed
the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator
revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same
experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition
must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can
know anything of them a priori.
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