We may add the remark that the
representation of something permanent in existence, is not the same
thing as the permanent representation; for a representation may be
very variable and changing- as all our representations, even that of
matter, are- and yet refer to something permanent, which must,
therefore, be distinct from all my representations and external to me,
the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of
my own existence, and with it constitutes one experience- an
experience which would not even be possible internally, if it were not
also at the same time, in part, external. To the question How? we
are no more able to reply, than we are, in general, to think the
stationary in time, the coexistence of which with the variable,
produces the conception of change.
In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible
as possible, I have been compelled to leave out or abridge various
passages which were not essential to the completeness of the work, but
which many readers might consider useful in other respects, and
might be unwilling to miss. This trifling loss, which could not be
avoided without swelling the book beyond due limits, may be
supplied, at the pleasure of the reader, by a comparison with the
first edition, and will, I hope, be more than compensated for by the
greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands.
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